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Open Season on the Journalist's Privilege:
Do Recent Rulings Represent a Trend
Against Assertions of the Privilege
or Proper Applications of Existing Law?
Will E. Messer'
A legal issue can smolderforyears until suddenly the winds of a larger con-
troversy fan it into flame. Such has been the case with the question whether
information received in confidence by journalists is entitled to a legalprivi-
lege against compulsory process.
2
INTRODUCTION
N a year filled with historic events-U.S. President George W. Bush won
re-election,3 Major League Baseball's Boston Red Sox captured an elu-
sive World Series, 4 and a tsunami devastated Southeast Asia5-the journal-
ists who reported these events will find 2004's significance lies not on the
campaign trail, the ball field, or the disaster area but instead lies in the
courtroom. In no less than four separate legal proceedings, journalists who
sought to keep their sources confidential by relying on a "journalist's priv-
ilege" faced contempt-of-court charges.6 These cases came on the heels
i J.D. expected 2oo6, University of Kentucky; B.A. 2003, University of Kentucky.
2 Vince Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REV. 229, 229
(197).
3 Richard Benedetto & Judy Keen, President Gets to Celebrate Win This Time, U.S.A. TODAY,
Nov. 4, 2004, at 5A.
4 Mel Antonen, Red Sox Sweep Away Old Identity, U.S.A. TODAY, Oct. 28, 2004, at 4C.
5 Dan Vergano, Clash of Continents Unleashed Deadly Waves, U.S.A. TODAY, Dec. 28, 2004,
at toA.
6 See, e.g., Lee v. DOJ, 413 F3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (ruling followed 2004 district court rul-
ing ordering journalists in contempt), cert. denied, Miller v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 2977 (2005);
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (ruling followed 2004
district court ruling ordering journalists in contempt); In re Special Proceedings, 373 F3d 37
(ist Cir. 2004) (ruling followed previous district court ruling ordering journalist in contempt);
Weinberger v. Maplewood Review, 668 N.W.2d 667 (Minn. 2003) (holding that the journalist
could not seek shelter behind the privilege).
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of high-profile judgments in 2ooI 7 and 20038 that also cast doubt on the
continued viability of the privilege. The litigation in two of these cases
continued into 2005,9 a year that, ironically, will partially be remembered
as the year in which the most important confidential source in modern U.S.
journalism, "Deep Throat," outed himself.'0
The developments in 2004 and 2005 concerning the journalist's privi-
lege make this Note's introductory quote-written on the eve of the Su-
preme Court's seminal journalist's privilege ruling, Branzbutgv. Hayes"-as
prescient in 2004 as it was in 1971. The "larger controversy" to which the
quote refers involved the federal government's efforts to probe and curb
radical activity spawned by the Vietnam War and the civil rights move-
ment of the I96os.' 2 A consequence of these efforts was a sharp increase
in subpoenas issued against journalists in the late I96os.' 3 Such attempts
to discover the identities of radical protestors set the stage for Branzbutg.
In that 1972 case, the Supreme Court held that journalists could not assert
a "journalist's privilege" in response to subpoenas issuing from grand jury
investigations.'4 The Court held that the government has a compelling in-
terest in investigating crime, and this interest justifies the intrusion of the
public's First Amendment interest.' s
Now, more than thirty years later, the flames rise again, stoked by a
series of controversies ranging from matters of national security
16 to civil
defamation claims.' 7 But, while the facts and circumstances surrounding
each assertion of journalist's privilege differ, a constant runs through each
7 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 29 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2301 (5th Cir. 2001).
8 McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003).
9 Lee v. DOJ, 413 F3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397
F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
10 "Deep Throat" was identified as FBI agent W. Mark Felt in a July, 2005, Vanity Fair
article. John D. O'Connor, "I'm the Guy They CalledDeep Throat," VANiTy FAIR, July 2005, at 86.
I Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
12 Karl H. Schmid, Journalist's Privilege in Criminal Proceedings: An Analysis of the United
States Courts of Appeals' Decisions from 1973 to 1999,39 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1441, 1442 (2002).
13 Blasi, supra note 2, at 229-30.
14 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667.
15 Id. at 700 (quoting Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 525 (i96o) (concluding
that "the investigation of crime by the grand jury implements a fundamental governmental
role of securing the safety of the person and property of the citizen, and it appears to us that
calling reporters to give testimony in the manner and for the reasons that other citizens are
called 'bears a reasonable relationship to the achievement of the governmental purpose as-
serted as its justification"').
16 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (involving a
journalist's refusal to reveal confidential sources in response to a special prosecutor's investiga-
tion into the outing of an undercover CIA operative).
17 Lee v. DOJ, 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (involving a former government scientist's
defamation claim); Weinberger v. Maplewood Review, 668 N.W.2d 667 (Minn. 2003) (involv-
ing a fired high school football coach's defamation claim).
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scenario: the privilege was denied. 8 Aside from the predictable outrage
stemming from these rulings, 9 much news media dialogue has focused on
two things: (i) whether the recent rulings signal the end of the privilege,"
and (2) what can be done to reverse the trend."'
An analysis of the recent cases and a review of post-Branzberg journal-
ist's privilege law suggest that the new rulings do not imply an end of the
privilege. Rather, these rulings represent proper applications of existing
privilege law.
Part I of this Note offers an overview of the origins of the journalist's
privilege and an analysis of the Branzburg opinion.22 Part II outlines the
privilege's post-Branzburg evolution.23 Part III provides a case-by-case
analysis of the recent developments in journalist's privilege law and at-
tempts to judge what impact the rulings will have on the privilege.4
I8 Lee, 413 E3d at 53; Miller, 397 F3d at 964; In re Special Proceedings, 373 F3d 37 (Ist
Cir. 2004); Weinberger, 668 N.W.zd at 667.
19 See Walter Shapiro, 'Time' Reporter Being Unfairly Punished in Debacle Over CIA Leak,
U.S.A. TODAY, Aug. 20, 2004, at 8A; Editorial, Leak Probe Threatens Reporters' Privilege, THE
HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Oct. I I, 2004, at IoA (concluding that the recent rulings might rep-
resent "a growing precedent by which prosecutors can wipe out a reporter's pledge of confi-
dentiality, either to conduct fishing expeditions, or to intimidate reporters in their necessary
work"); Editorial, Press Freedom on the Precipice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2004, at AI6 (arguing that
"[tihe specter of reporters' being imprisoned merely for doing their jobs is something that
should worry everyone who cherishes the First Amendment and the essential role of a free
press in a democracy"); Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, Jr. & Russell T Lewis, Editorial, The Promise
of the FirstAmendment, N.Y. TIMES, OCT. 10, 2004, at AI I; Editorial, AndStrikes a Blow ata Strong
Press, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2uu5, at A22 ("The jailing of reporters for pursuing the truth rings
particularly medieval in this information age."). But see Bruce Fein, Losing Sight of Free Press
Aims, THE WASHINGTONTIMES, Aug. 17, 2004, atAl5 (arguing that journalists might be entitled
to a qualified privilege under some circumstances, "but the criminal investigation of the Bush
administration leak of Valerie Plame's identity is not such a candidate"); Geoffrey R. Stone,
Miller Novak, Plame, Wilson..., THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Oct. I8, 2oo4, at Ai8 (rebutting The
New York Times' argument that jailing journalists violated the First Amendment).
20 See Michael Kirkland, Are 'Sourced' Stories Extinct?, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL,
Sept. 20, 2oo4; Richard Willing, Reporters Try to ShieldSources' Identities in Inquiry, U.S.A. TODAY,
Sept. 3, 2004, at 13A (highlighting recent cases dealing with the issue of journalists' privilege);
Jacques Steinberg, Setbacks on Press Protections Are Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2004, at A i6; Adam
Liptak, Courts Grow Increasingly Skeptical of Any Special Protections for the Press, N.Y. TIMES, June
28, 2005, at AI 6 ("'We're seeing outright contempt for an independent press in a free society,'
said Jane Kirtley, who teaches media ethics and law at the University of Minnesota. 'The fact
that courts have no appreciation for this is new, is troubling, and you cannot overestimate the
impact it will have over time."').
21 The New York Times has repeatedly encouraged Congress to pass a federal shield law
to solve the journalist's privilege issue. See Sulzberger & Lewis, supra note I9, at AI ("[Ilt is
now time for Congress to follow the lead of the states and enact a federal shield law for jour-
nalists."); Editorial, Press Freedom on the Precipice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2oo4, at Ai6.
22 See infra notes 25-93 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 94-121 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 122-288 and accompanying text.
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I. THE ORIGIN OF THE JOURNALIST'S PRIVILEGE
A. Pre-Branzburg Development of the Privilege
Journalists seeking to maintain the confidentiality of their sources when
confronted with a subpoena is not a recent phenomenon.2 5 However, al-
most all litigation on this controversy in the federal courts has occurred
within the last forty-five years. The first such instance occurred in a Sec-
ond Circuit case in 1958, Garlandv. Torre,26 when the actress Judy Garland
sought to force the disclosure of Marie Torre's confidential sources. 7 The
dispute arose out of a defamation suit Garland had filed against Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS).2" Torre wrote a column for the New York
Herald Tribune that quoted an unnamed CBS executive.29 Garland alleged
that the quotes attributed to the executive were false and defamatory.30
To settle the issue, the trial court ordered Torre to reveal her source, and
she refused, citing privilege.31 The court held her in contempt, and she ap-
pealed.32 Although Torre lost her appeal, the three-prong test that the court
employed 33 to resolve the issue remains in use today.34
There is an explanation for the concentration of privilege litigation
within the last forty-five years: while subpoenas always posed problems for
journalists working with confidential sources, such court orders were not
issued "in such numbers and circumstances as to generate consternation
in virtually all quarters of the journalism profession and a questioning by
many reporters of the Government's motives" until the late i960s.35 The
federal government believed that the subpoenas were a necessary compo-
nent of its effort to throttle fringe groups involved with the ongoing civil
rights movement and protests of the Vietnam War.36 But the journalists who
25 See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 2, at 229 n.I (recounting Benjamin Franklin's appearance
before a government official who sought to discover the identity of an author).
26 Garland v. Torre, 259 E2d 545 (2d Cit. 1958).
27 Id. at 547.
z8 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 The court held the party seeking disclosure (i) made "reasonable efforts" to discover
the information from alternative sources, (z) that the party's claim was not "patently frivo-
lous," and (3) that "[tihe information sought was of obvious materiality and relevance." Id.
at 551.
34 See, e.g., Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 62 1 Ezd 721, 726 (5th Cir. 198o); Bruno &
Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 E2d 583, 598 (1st Cir. 198o).
35 Blasi, supra note 2, at 230.
36 Schmid, supra note 12, at 1442.
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were the targets of those court orders insisted that newspaper reporters
would face an unfair "burden" on their ability to gather news if forced to
respond to subpoenas.
37
In 1970, this tension produced Caldwellv. United States.38 Earl Caldwell
was a New York Times reporter covering the Black Panther Party.39 Feder-
al authorities were investigating criminal activity linked to the party and
subpoenaed Caldwell to appear before a federal grand jury in the North-
ern District of California.4o The district court entered an order instructing
Caldwell to appear but also granted him a "privilege of silence as to certain
matters until such time as the Government should demonstrate 'a compel-
ling and over-riding national interest in requiring Mr. Caldwell's testimony
which cannot be served by any alternative means."' 4' Caldwell appealed
the order, arguing that he could not be compelled to attend the hearing
at all without a showing of a specific need by the government. 42 Caldwell
alleged that because of the secretive nature of grand jury proceedings, a
qualified privilege would not be sufficient to maintain the level of confi-
dence he enjoyed with his sources.
43
The Ninth Circuit agreed," and, in doing so, "became the first fed-
eral circuit court to extend explicit constitutional protection to the press." 4 s
Noting that "[tihe need for an untrammeled press takes on special urgency
in times of widespread protest and dissent,"46 the court held that if a jour-
nalist seeking to assert privilege can show that her participation in secret
grand jury proceedings endangers the public's First Amendment right to
be informed, the journalist cannot be compelled to attend a grand jury pro-
ceeding unless the government demonstrates "a compelling need for the
witness's presence." 4
7
37 See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,69o-91 (1972).
38 Caldwell v. United States, 434 Ezd io8i (9th Cir. 1970), frv'd, United States v.
Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
39 Id. at 1082.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 1083.
43 Id.
44 Id. at i09o.
45 Nancy V. Mate, Comment, Piercing The Shield: Reporter Privilege in Minnesota Following
State v. Turner, 82 MINN. L. REv. 1563, 1569 (1998).
46 Caldwell, 434 E2d at 1o84-85.
47 Id. at io89.
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B. The Seminal Decision: Branzburg v. Hayes
i. Factual Background.-The Supreme Court abridged the protection
Caldwell provided two years later when it decided Branzburg v. Hayes,4
the seminal case on journalist's privilege. Branzburg consisted of four con-
solidated cases. Two of these involved articles written by Paul Branzburg,
a reporter for the Louisville Courier-Journal.49 The first case, Branzburg v.
Pound,5° originated when the Courier-Journal published an article written
by Branzburg that contained observations of two Jefferson County resi-
dents making hashish from marijuana. 5' Branzburg was subsequently sub-
poenaed by the Jefferson County grand jury, but he refused to identify
those he saw in possession of marijuana or those synthesizing hashish.52 He
relied on Kentucky's journalist's privilege statute. 53 The Kentucky Court
of Appeals (now the Kentucky Supreme Court) ruled against Branzburg,
holding that the Kentucky statute provided no protection to a journalist for
events he observed personally.54
In the second case, Branzburgv. Meigs,55 the Courier-Journal published an
article about the drug culture in Frankfort, Kentucky in which Branzburg
recounted conversations he had had with several unnamed drug users. 56 In
this instance, the Franklin County grand jury subpoenaed Branzburg, and
he moved to quash the summons.5 7 Again, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
ruled against him. 58 The court was not persuaded by Branzburg's argument
that, if the court forced him to testify about his anonymous sources, his
ability to perform his job would suffer.59
The third case, In re Pappas,60 involved a television journalist/photogra-
pher who worked for a news station in New Bedford, Massachusetts. 6' Pap-
pas had spent approximately three hours inside the New Bedford head-
48 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
49 Id. at 667.
50 Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 197o), aff'dsub nom. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665 (1972).
51 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667.
52 Id. at 668.
53 Id.; see also Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (2004).
54 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 669.
55 Branzburg v. Meigs, 503 S.W.zd 748 (Ky. 197 1), aff'dsub nom. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665 (1972).
56 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 669.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 67o.
60 In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1971), aff'd, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
61 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672.
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quarters of the Black Panther Party.62 In advance of entry, however, Pappas
agreed to disclose nothing about what he saw or heard except events relat-
ing to an anticipated police raid that never occurred. 63 As a result, Pappas
prepared no story about the time he spent in the headquarters and did not
otherwise disclose any information about his time there.64 Pappas was later
subpoenaed to appear before the Bristol County grand jury where he re-
fused to answer any questions about what he saw or heard inside the head-
quarters. 65 Unlike Branzburg, Pappas had no state journalist's privilege stat-
ute upon which to rely, but he argued he had a First Amendment privilege
nonetheless.' A trial judge refused to grant Pappas' motion to quash, and
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts agreed with that decision.67
The Massachusetts court concluded that "the obligation of newsmen... is
that of every citizen ... to appear when summoned, with relevant written
or other material when required, and to answer relevant and reasonable
inquiries.
68
The final case was Caldwellv. United States,69 a decision that was heavily
criticized by its companion cases. The Kentucky court characterized the
decision as "a drastic departure from the generally recognized rule that the
sources of information of a newspaper reporter are not privileged under the
First Amendment." 70 The Massachusetts court stated "that there exists no
constitutional newsman's privilege, either qualified or absolute, to refuse to
appear and testify before a court or grand jury."'
7
2. Majority and Concurring Opinions. -Justice White, speaking for the Su-
preme Court, framed the issue as whether journalists, like ordinary citizens,
have an obligation to respond to grand jury subpoenas and answer ques-
tions about its investigations.72 The Court held that journalists do share
this duty.73 Echoing the sentiments of the Kentucky Court of Appeals in
Branzburg v. Meigs, the Court observed that "[i]t is thus not surprising that
the great weight of authority is that newsmen are not exempt from the
normal duty of appearing before a grand jury and answering questions
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 672-73.
66 Id. at 673.
67 Id. at 673-74.
68 Id. at 674 (quoting In re Pappas, 266 N.E.zd 297,303 (197)).
69 Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d io8i (9th Cir. 197o). For a discussion of Caldwell,
see supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
70 Branzbulg, 408 U.S. at 670.
71 Id. at 674.
72 Id. at 667.
73 Id. at 702.
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relevant to a criminal investigation."74 Ultimately, the Court decided the
case by balancing the public's First Amendment interest in the free flow
of information against the State's interest in solving crime. 75 It noted that
because "the grand jury implements a fundamental governmental role of
securing the safety of the person and property" and requiring journalists
to testify before it "bears a reasonable relationship to the achievement of
the governmental purpose asserted as its justification," the State's interest
in a journalist's testimony will always be compelling enough to warrant the
intrusion on the First Amendment.76
The Court also discussed the practical difficulties facing a court at-
tempting to evaluate an assertion of the type-of qualified privilege created
by Caldwell.77 Such a privilege "would present practical and conceptual dif-
ficulties of a high order,"718 and it would involve the courts "in distinguish-
ing between the value of enforcing different criminal laws." 79 The Court
held that this was a task best left to the legislature: "The task of judges ... is
not to make the law, but to uphold it in accordance with their oaths."'8
Ultimately, the Court's ruling affirmed the decisions of the Kentucky and
Massachusetts courts and reversed the Ninth Circuit's ruling.8'
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell wrote to highlight what he
termed "the limited nature of the Court's holding."8 He emphasized that
the ruling does not permit the harassment of journalists.8 3 If a journalist be-
lieves an investigation lacks good faith, she is free to challenge a subpoena
on the basis that her testimony bears "only a remote and tenuous relation-
ship to the subject of the investigation" or that her testimony is not a "legit-
imate need of law enforcement."8 4 Such challenges, Justice Powell wrote,
should be adjudicated on a case-by-case basis by balancing the "freedom of
the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with
respect to criminal conduct."8'
3. Dissenting Opinions. -Justice Douglas' dissent advocated that journalists
should enjoy an absolute privilege unless personally involved in a crime.8 6
74 Id. at 685.
75 Id. at 699-700.
76 Id. at 700 (quoting Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 5 16, 525 (196o)).
77 Id. at 702.
78 Id. at 704.
79 Id. at 705-06.
8o Id. at 706.
81 Id. at 7o8.
82 Id. at 709.
83 Id. at 709-10.
84 Id. at 71o.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 712 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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He justified his stance on his belief "that all of the 'balancing' was done
by those who wrote the Bill of Rights. By casting the First Amendment
in absolute terms, they repudiated the timid, watered-down, emasculated
versions" argued for by the federal government.8 7 The danger with a bal-
ancing approach, Justice Douglas wrote, is that, "[s]ooner or later, any test
which provides less than blanket protection to beliefs and associations will
be twisted and relaxed so as to provide virtually no protection at all."18
Justice Stewart's dissent proposed a three-part test similar to the one
proposed in Caldwell. 9 First, the State must show probable cause to believe
the journalist has information "clearly relevant to a specific probable viola-
tion of law."-9 Second, the State must "demonstrate that the information
sought cannot -be obtained by alternative means less destructive of First
Amendment rights."9' Finally, the State must "demonstrate a compelling
and overriding interest in the information."92 Justice Stewart found Garland
illustrative of this point: he noted that the Ninth Circuit found that the
identity of Torre's source was undoubtedly material to Garland's claim.
93
II. POsT-BRANBURG EVOLUTION OF THE JOURNALIST'S PRIVILEGE
A. Shield Laws
In Branzburg, the Court noted that "[a] number of States have provided
newsmen a statutory privilege of varying breadth, but the majority have not
done so, and none has been provided by federal statute."94 Such statutes
are commonly referred to as shield laws. States passed these statutes to pro-
vide some protection to journalists who faced threats of jail for refusing to
disclose confidential sources and information. They offer varying degrees
of protection and their applicability often depends on the factual circum-
stances surrounding a particular case.95 Maryland passed the first shield law
in 1896,96 and ten more states followed between 1933 and 1941.97 By the
time the Court decided Branzburg, seventeen states had enacted shield
87 Id. at 713.
88 Id. at 720.
89 Id. at 743.
9o Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 743 n.33.
94 Id. at 689 (majority opinion).
95 Mate, supra note 45, at 1568.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 1568-69.
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laws.98 In the thirty-two years since Branzburg, an additional fourteen states
and the District of Columbia have enacted shield laws. 99 In I999, North
Carolina became the most recent state to do so."
Shield law activity at the state level has not led to analogous activity
at the federal level; indeed, there continues to be no federal shield law. As
the Court noted in Branzburg, legislation that would have created a federal
shield law was introduced in Congress l'0 but failed.' °2 Lawmakers proposed
bills involving a federal shield law in Branzbutg's wake, but they too suf-
fered a similar fate.103 The implicit meaning behind Congress' failure to act
is that it did not believe a federal journalist's privilege was necessary to pro-
tect the public's First Amendment interests. However, other reasons also
explain Congress' lack of response. For example, as noted in Branzburg, in
1970 the Department of Justice created a set of guidelines to police its use
of subpoenas against journalists. 104 Perhaps more important, however, were
the decisions of federal circuit courts that interpreted Branzburg as creating
a qualified journalist's privilege.'05 These decisions arguably lessened the
need for a federal statute.
B. Federal Circuit Courts' Interpretations of Branzburg
As Justice Powell noted in his concurring opinion, Branzburg is a fact-spe-
cific opinion.' 6 It is noteworthy that the journalists in the four consolidated
cases were all alleged eyewitnesses to crimes and were responding to grand
jury subpoenas.'0 7 Branzburg is certainly the definitive ruling regarding
journalists' attempts to quash subpoenas issued from grand juries, and the
opinion sets the bar high. It essentially requires that the journalist show the
subpoena was issued in bad faith. 10
98 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690 n.27.
99 Edward L. Carter, Notes and Comments, Reporter's Privilege in Utah, 18 BYU J. PUB.
L. 163, 171-72 (2003).
io Laurence B. Alexander, Looking Outfor the Watchdogs: A Legislative Proposal Limiting the
Newsgathering Privilege to Journalists in the Greatest Need of Protection for Sources and Information,
20 YALE L. & PoL'v REv. 97, 97 (2002).
ioi Branzbutg, 408 U.S. at 691 n.z8.
102 Id. at 689.
103 Mate, supra note 45, at 1573. In February 2005, identical bills purporting to create an
absolute journalist's privilege were introduced in the House and Senate. Jonathan E. Kaplan,
Advocates for Journalists May Take Agenda to K Street, THE HILL, Feb. 10, 2005, at 3. As of August
2005, no further action had been taken on the bills.
1o4 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707 n.4I.
105 Mate, supra note 45, at 1573.
io6 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 7 10 (Powell, J., concurring).
107 See supra notes 48-71 and accompanying text.
io8 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707-08.
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Although Branzbutg proved dispositive on privilege claims regard-
ing grand jury subpoenas, it did not address whether the privilege could
be asserted in other scenarios such as in response to subpoenas issued in
connection with civil cases or from criminal defendants. Thus, the circuit
courts were given some freedom to resolve journalist's privilege litigation
that did not involve subpoenas issuing from a grand jury.
The circuit courts' interpretations of these issues have been favorable
to journalists. All twelve of the federal circuits have recognized the exis-
tence of some form of a qualified journalist's privilege.109 The circuits use
different approaches to evaluate claims of privilege. At least two circuits
use the test articulated in Garland v. Torre.10 Several circuits use variations
of that three-pronged test.'" The Tenth Circuit uses a four-pronged test.11
2
io9 See Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F3d 708 (st Cir. 1998) (recognizing and up-
holding a qualified privilege for a nonparty to an antitrust case); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v.
Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (ist Cir. 198o) (vacating a district court ruling ordering
disclosure of confidential sources); United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1983) (uphold-
ing a qualified privilege in response to a discovery request from a criminal defendant); Riley
v. City of Chester, 612 E2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979) (recognizing a qualified privilege for a nonparty
journalist in civil litigation); Larouche v. NBC, 780 F.zd 1134 (4th Cir. 1986) (recognizing a
qualified privilege for defendant journalist in defamation case); Miller v. Transamerican Press,
Inc., 6z F.2d 721 (5 th Cir. I98O) (recognizing a qualified privilege but declining to apply it on
the instant facts); NLRB v. Midland Daily News, 151 E3d 472 (6th Cir. 1998) (applying a com-
mercial speech analysis, the court allowed a newspaper to maintain the confidentiality of its
advertiser); Desai v. Hersh, 954 Fd 14o8 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming a district court order that
a journalist libel defendant could testify about the reliability of his sources without disclosing
their identity); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 Ezd 986 (8th Cir. 1972) (upholding libel defen-
dant journalist's assertion of privilege); Shoen v. Shoen, 48 E3 d 412 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding
defendant author's assertion of privilege in a defamation case); Farr v. Pitchess, 522 Ed 464
(9th Cir. 1975) (recognizing a qualified privilege but failing to apply it to the instant factual
scenario); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 E2d 433 (0oth Cir. 1977) (allowing a nonparry
journalist's assertion of privilege in response to a subpoena issued by a civil defendant); United
States v. Caporale, 8o6 E2d 1487 (i ith Cir. 1986) (upholding nonparty journalist's assertion of
privilege); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (upholding nonparty journalist's as-
sertion of privilege); Carey v. Hume, 492 Ed 631 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (recognizing the existence
of a qualified privilege but refusing to permit libel defendant journalist to assert it.
i io See Miller, 621 E2d at 726; Bruno &Stillman, 633 F2d at 598. The Garland test asks
the following: (I) is the information relevant?, (2) can the information be obtained by reason-
able alternative means?, (3) is there a compelling interest in the information? See Garland v.
Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 551 (2d Cir. 1958).
iii The Second Circuit asks whether the information is "highly material and relevant,
necessary or critical to the maintenance of the claim, and not obtainable from other available
sources." Burke, 700 F2d at 77. Like the Second Circuit, the Fourth Circuit asks whether the
information is relevant and whether it can be obtained from alternative sources. It also asks
"whether there is a compelling interest in the information." Larouche, 780 F2d at 1 139. The
Ninth Circuit asks: "(i) whether the requesting party has exhausted all reasonable alternative
sources; (2) whether the information sought is relevant, material, and noncumulative; and (3)
whether the information sought is crucial to the maintenance of the plaintiffs' legal claims."
Shoen, 48 F 3 d at 415.
112 "1. Whether the party seeking information has independently attempted to obtain
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The other circuits use a basic balancing test where First Amendment in-
terests are weighed against the interests of the party seeking disclosure." 3
In these circuits, like those using the multipronged tests, the party seeking
disclosure generally must show that the information could not be obtained
through an alternative source and that the information is relevant to her
claim. '" 4 Some of these circuits also require that alternative sources be ex-
hausted, a requirement seemingly much more difficult to satisfy than Gar-
land's requirement that the discovering party make "reasonable efforts" to
discover the information from alternative sources." 5
This discussion illustrates that, outside the factual scenario presented
in Branzburg," 6 journalists have been successful in arguing a qualified privi-
lege. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit concluded that in civil litigation there should
be a preference for assertions of the privilege."7 Conversely, journalists en-
joyed no such success arguing that the privilege should apply in scenarios
similar to Branzburg. There appears to be only one circuit court case recog-
nizing a qualified privilege in this scenario," 8 and there are very few circuit
court cases addressing assertions of privilege in response to grand jury or
special prosecutor investigations. In Scarcev. United States," 9 a case in which
a journalist challenged a contempt order after refusing to answer questions
before a grand jury, the Ninth Circuit observed that journalists' success in
arguing privilege in scenarios factually distinct from Branzburg had no bear-
ing on the instant facts. "[The journalist] cites to an array of cases in which
other Courts of Appeals have held that a reporter has a qualified privilege to
withhold confidential information, but we observe that those cases did not
the information elsewhere and has been unsuccessful. 2. Whether the information goes to the
heart of the matter. 3. Whether the information is of certain relevance. 4. The type of contro-
versy." Silkwood, 563 Fad at 438.
113 See Riley v. City of Chester, 6i2 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979); Desai v. Hersh, 954 E2d 1408
(7th Cir. 1992); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Caporale,
8o6 F2d 1487 (1 ith Cir. 1986); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
114 See, e.g., Caporale, 806 E2d at 1504 (holding "that information may only be compelled
from a reporter claiming privilege if the party requesting the information can show that it is
highly relevant, necessary to the proper presentation of the case, and unavailable from other
sources").
115 Riley, 612 F2d at 717 (holding that "[pilaintiffs must show that they exhausted other
means of obtaining the information").
16 See supra notes 48-71 and accompanying text. In Branzburg, the Court addressed
four consolidated cases where four separate journalists individually tried to invoke a qualified
journalist's privilege. Each journalist attempted to effect the privilege to prevent revealing his
confidential sources in ongoing grand jury proceedings.
117 "Thus in the ordinary case the civil litigant's interest in disclosure should yield to the
journalist's privilege." Zerilli v. Smith, 656 Ead 705, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
118 In ir Williams, 766 F Supp. 358 (W.D. Pa. 199 1), aff'den banc by equally divided court,
963 F2d 567 (3d Cir. 1992) (ruling did not discuss merits of the case).
i 19 Scarce v. United States, 5 F3d 397,402 (9th Cir. 1993).
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involve grand jury inquiries."' 2 This ruling illustrates that advancements
in other areas of journalist's privilege law failed to influence the state of the
law in grand jury settings. Thus, after Branzburg, the federal courts virtually
unanimously disallowed assertions of privilege in the face of a subpoena or
criminal investigation absent a showing of bad faith.121
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN JOURNALIST'S PRIVILEGE LAW
Branzburg was certainly a setback for proponents of the journalist's privi-
lege. The majority opinion leaves little room for an assertion of privilege
in response to a subpoena to appear before a grand jury.'2 2 But Justice
Powell's concurrence left a slight crack in the door concerning such grand
jury subpoenas, 2 3 and the majority opinion left the door wide open with
respect to other scenarios in which privilege might be asserted."14 Both the
federal courts and the states-through their legislative bodies-have since
responded to these openings. All of the federal circuit courts have recog-
nized at least some form of a journalist's privilege,25 and in the years since
Branzburg, fourteen states and the District of Columbia2 6 have enacted
shield laws to join the seventeen mentioned in that landmark opinion. But
a series of high-profile cases since the turn of the 2 1 st century have spurred
speculation that the trend in the courts toward a broader journalist's privi-
lege has halted and possibly reversed.
A. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas:' 27 The Vanessa Leggett Case
In 2000, Vanessa Leggett was an adjunct university lecturer at the Uni-
versity of Houston-Downtown moonlighting as an aspiring true-crime
writer.' Two years later, she was transformed into a First Amendment mar-
2o Id. at 403.
121 A case illustrative of this point is Storer Commc'n, Inc. v. Giovan, 810 F2d 580 (6th Cir.
1987). In that ruling, the Sixth Circuit concluded that "[t]he Constitution does not, as it never
has, exempt the newsman from performing the citizen's normal duty of appearing and furnish-
ing information relevant to the grand jury's task." Id. at 583 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665,689-91 (1972)).
122 See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
123 See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
124 See supra notes 109-21 and accompanying text.
125 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
126 Carter, supra note 99, at 171-72.
127 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, No. 01-20745 (5th Cir. Aug. 17, 2001) (per curiam).
128 Ross E. Milloy, Writer Who Was Jailed in Notes Disputes is Freed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5,
2002, at A8.
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tyr.' 29 During the course of those two years, Leggett investigated a high-
profile Houston murder, refused to divulge the fruits of her research to a
grand jury, and spent 168 days in jail.130
Leggett's ordeal began with the murder of Doris Angleton on April I6,
1997.131 Houston prosecutors believed Doris' husband, Robert Angleton,
had paid his brother, Roger Angleton, to commit the crime.132 But before
either could be tried for the murder, Roger committed suicide, leaving a
note confessing to the crime. 33 Robert, a bookie, was acquitted in state
court-but federal prosecutors began investigating him on charges of tax
evasion and money laundering. 34
In December 2000, a federal grand jury subpoenaed Leggett'35 and she
did in fact appear.'36 In the summer of 2001, Leggett received a second
and third subpoena, but when she appeared before the grand jury on July
19, zooi, she refused to cooperate with the terms of the subpoenas, cit-
ing journalist's privilege.37 The court then cited her for civil contempt'3s
pursuant to z8 U.S.C. § 1826(a), which permits jailing for up to eighteen
months. '39 In an unpublished opinion, the Fifth Circuit refused to grant
Leggett's motion to quash. 40 The Fifth Circuit, following Branzburg, held
that "the journalist's privilege is ineffectual against a grand jury subpoena
absent evidence of governmental harassment or oppression."'4' As a result,
Leggett remained jailed until January 4, 2002, when the federal grand jury's
term expired.42
129 Jailed Writer Wins PEN/Newman's Own First Amendment Award, ThE ASSOCIATED
PRESS, April 12, 2ooz, available at http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.
asp?documentlD= i6o59.
130 Milloy, supra note 128, at A8.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Leggett was subpoenaed because, while working at the University of Houston-
Downtown, she had been seeking a subject for a true-crime book she wished to write.
Eventually, "a chance conversation with Roger Angleton led to hundreds of interviews with
him and other people close to the case." Id. Federal agents were in dire need of the informa-
tion contained in those interviews and hoped to compel her cooperation by issuing her the
initial subpoena ld.
136 Schmid, snpra note Iz, at 1441 l. i.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 1441.
139 28 U.S.C. § i8z6(a) (2oo0).
140 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, No. 01-20745 (5th Cir. Aug. 17, 2001) (per curium).
141 Id.
142 Milloy, supra note 128, at A8.
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The I68 days Leggett spent jailed represent a record in the United
States for journalists refusing to reveal their sources and work product;'
43
her plight certainly did not go unnoticed. In April 2002, she received the
PEN/Newman's Own First Amendment Award which honors those who
fight to safeguard First Amendment rights.' 44 Proponents of a journalist's
privilege for grand jury subpoenas said Leggett's case was critical in that
it illustrated the severe penalties journalists may face when they shield
sources and work product.4
5
It is understandable that proponents of a privilege would express out-
rage at the length of time Leggett spent jailed. It is more difficult, how-
ever, to understand why the case would be deemed critical given that the
law regarding assertions of privilege in the face of grand jury subpoenas is
relatively black and white-in Branzburg, the Court essentially held that
no such privilege exists unless a journalist can show bad faith. 46 It is well
documented that the federal courts of appeals have recognized a qualified
journalist's privilege in civil suits. I47 Some circuits also recognize a privi-
lege for subpoenas emanating from a criminal defendant. 48 But the federal
circuits have roundly rejected claims of privilege in response to grand jury
investigations. 49 Indeed, commentators have noted the rarity with which
federal courts of appeals hear privilege claims issuing from criminal ap-
peals.5 Thus, it hardly seems surprising that the Leggett litigation un-
folded as it did.
B. McKevitt v. Pallasch
In McKevitt v. Pallasch'-', Irish authorities charged Michael McKevitt with
directing terrorist activities through his involvement in a splinter group of
the Irish Republican Army.'52 The prosecution's most important witness
143 Id.
144 "In naming Leggett the recipient of the PEN award yesterday, the judges called
her 'a powerful example of personal conviction and courage in the face of the most extreme
pressure' and 'a hero in the effort to preserve investigative freedom for writers and journalists
in the U.S.," Jailed Writer Wins PEN/Newman's Own First Amendment Award, THE ASSOCIATED
PRESs, April 12, 2002, available at http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.
asp?documentlD= 16059.
145 Milloy, supra note 128, at A8.
146 See supra notes 72-85 and accompanying text.
147 See supra notes io6-21 and accompanying text.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Schmid, supra note 12, at 1441. Implicit in the lack of litigation of this matter is the
conclusion that state law in this area is settled.
151 McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003).
152 Heather Stamp, Case Note and Comment, McKevitt v. Pallasch: How the Ghosts of the
Branzburg Decision are Haunting Journalists in the Seventh Circuit, 14 DEPAuL-LCA J. ART & ENT.
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was Daniel Rupert who was the subject of a biography being written by
three Chicago journalists-Flynn McRoberts, Abdon Pallasch, and Robert
C. Herguth.'5 3 McKevitt's attorneys filed a motion in federal court in Illinois
asking the court to order the journalists to produce the tapes of their inter-
views with Rupert so that McKevitt might use them to discredit Rupert's
testimony.15 The district court ordered that the tapes be produced, and the
journalists subsequently appealed to the Seventh Circuit.155
However, the journalists found no relief at the appellate level. I56 To the
dismay of proponents of the privilege,'57 Judge Posner, speaking for the
court, questioned the need for such a privilege: "It seems to us that rather
than speaking of privilege, courts should simply make sure that a subpoena
duces tecum directed to the media, like any other subpoena duces tecum,
is reasonable in the circumstances, which is the general criterion for judicial
review of subpoenas." 158 The court found support for this position by citing
Branzburg's conclusion that journalists could, and should, quash subpoenas
issued in bad faith or to harass. 5
9
On its face, McKevitt certainly has more harmful consequences to the
privilege than the Vanessa Leggett case. Leggett faced a grand jury sub-
poena and, in light of Branzburg, the Fifth Circuit's ruling was predictable.
The Chicago journalists, unlike Leggett, faced a subpoena emanating from
a criminal defendant. And journalists asserting privilege have traditionally
had more success when the subpoena emanates from a defendant and not
a grand jury.'" But not only did the Seventh Circuit deny that privilege ex-
isted in this case, it seemingly denied the existence of any qualified privi-
lege.
Key factors present in McKevitt suggest the court's ruling might not be
as harsh as it seems. The first-and perhaps most important factor in the
Seventh Circuit's decisionmaking process-was that the journalists were
protecting no confidentiality.' 6' Rupert's identity was known, and he was
in favor of disclosing the information. 62 This was a fact certainly not lost
on Judge Posner: "When the information in the reporter's possession does
not come from a confidential source, it is difficult to see what possible bear-
ing the First Amendment could have on the question of compelled dis-
L. & Po'Y 363, 376 (2004).
153 Id. at 377.
154 McKevitt, 339 E3d at 531.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 535.
157 See, e.g., Stamp, supra note 152.
i58 McKevitt, 339 E3d at 533-
159 Id.
16o See supra notes 106-21 and accompanying text.
161 AcKevitt, 339 E3d at 533.
162 Id.
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closure." 63 In Branzburg, the Court noted that the primary rationale for a
privilege was that forcing journalists to disclose confidential sources would
have a chilling effect on would-be confidential sources.' 64 Today, leading
proponents of the privilege still cite the chilling effect as the basis for a
privilege.' 65 In light of this, the Seventh Circuit's position is sound.
The second factor is that an international criminal defendant sought to
compel disclosure. Although journalists have more success arguing privi-
lege when faced with a subpoena issuing from a criminal defendant than a
grand jury, journalists generally have more success arguing privilege when
faced with a subpoena originating from a civil litigant than from a criminal
defendant.'" Also, the fact that this defendant was facing charges of ter-
rorism might have been a latent factor in the court's reasoning. This case
was argued and decided after the events of September II, 2001, and the
court may not have wanted to jeopardize the Irish authorities' prosecution
of McKevitt. In light of these facts, it is entirely possible that the Seventh
Circuit might reach a different result in a civil matter or in circumstances in
which journalists are seeking to maintain the confidentiality of their sourc-
es as opposed to protecting estimated book sales. I6 7
C. Weinberger v. Maplewood Review'"
Unlike Vanessa Leggett, Wally Wakefield did not arrive in contempt of
court by writing a book; he did not even write a news article.' 69 Instead,
Wakefield-a retired elementary teacher working part-time for the Maple-
wood Review, a Minnesota newspaper-used his status as a reputable mem-
ber of his community to garner information from confidential sources.' 7
Wakefield contributed to an article about Tartan High School's decision to
163 Id.
164 Branzburg v. Hayes, 4o8 U.S. 665, 68I-8z (1972).
165 See, e.g., Part-Time Reporter Finds Himself Unlikely Journalism Hero, THE AssociATED
PRESS, July 4, 2004, available at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/%5Cnews.
aspx?id=13656. "Lucy Dalglish, executive director of the Reporters Committee for Freedom
of the Press .... argues that forcing a journalist to reveal sources to benefit one party in a law-
suit would jeopardize the perceived independence of the media. And it could have a chilling
effect on other people's willingness to speak. 'If people get the idea that "Well, someone is
promising me confidentiality, but look at that reporter in Maplewood-he wasn't able to keep
his promise, so what does that mean to me?""' Id.
166 See, e.g., Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 712 (D.C. Cir. i98i) (noting that in civil litiga-
tion, there should be a preference for the privilege).
167 "The reason they want it secreted is that the biography of him that they are planning
to write will be less marketable the more information in it that has already been made public."
McKevitt, 339 E3d at 533.
168 Weinberger v. Maplewood Review, 668 N.W.2d 667 (Minn. 2003).
169 Part-Time Reporter Finds Himself Unlikely Journalism Hero, supra note 165.
170 Id.
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fire its football coach, Richard Weinberger.' 7' The article included quotes
attributed to school officials and disparaging quotes from anonymous
sources, which Weinberger believed also came from school officials.' 72 In
turn, Weinberger sued the school district and four school officials for defa-
mation.' 73 He believed those officials provided the article's unattributed
quotes and sought to compel Wakefield to reveal his sources.' 74 Wakefield
refused to divulge them.'
75
To resolve the case, the Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted Min-
nesota's shield law, the Minnesota Free Flow of Information Act. 76 The
dispositive issue was the statute's defamation exception. 77 The Minnesota
high court concluded that Wakefield should be ordered to reveal his sourc-
es if the statute's three prongs were satisfied.'1
7
The court concluded that Weinberger satisfied the statute's first prong-
whether the party seeking disclosure "can demonstrate that the identity of
the source will lead to relevant evidence on the issue of actual malice"I79--
by demonstrating "that the identity of the source will lead to evidence hav-
ing any tendency to prove or disprove that the defendants spoke with the
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Weinberger, 668 N.W.2d at 669
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 MINN. STAT. §§ 595.021-595.025 (2004). Section 595.022 provides:
In order to protect the public interest and the free flow of information,
the news media should have the benefit of a substantial privilege not
to reveal sources of information or to disclose unpublished information.
To this end, the freedom of press requires protection of the confidential
relationship between the news gatherer and the source of information.
The purpose of sections 595.021 to 595.025 is to insure and perpetu-
ate, consistent with the public interest, the confidential relationship be-
tween the news media and its sources.
Section 595.023 provides:
Except as provided in section 595.024, no person who is or has been
directly engaged in the gathering, procuring, compiling, editing, or pub-
lishing of information for the purpose of transmission, dissemination or
publication to the public shall be required by any court, grand jury, agen-
cy, department or branch of the state, or any of its political subdivisions
or other public body, or by either house of the legislature or any commit-
tee, officer, member, or employee thereof, to disclose in any proceeding
the person or means from or through which information was obtained, or
to disclose any unpublished information procured by the person in the
course of work or any of the person's notes, memoranda, recording tapes,
film or other reportorial data whether or not it would tend to identify the
person or means through which the information was obtained.
177 § 595.025 (2004).
178 Winberger, 668 N.W.2d at 673.
179 Id. at 673 (citing § 595.025).
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knowledge that the statements were false or with reckless disregard as to
whether the statements were false or not." ,80 Second, the court considered
"whether 'there is probable cause to believe that [Wakefield's unnamed]
sources have information clearly relevant to the issue of defamation."" 8'
The court found that Weinberger satisfied this prong, too. 8 2 Finally, the
court examined "whether 'the information cannot be obtained by any al-
ternative means or remedy less destructive of first amendment rights.""
' 8 3
The court concluded that this factor also weighed in Weinberger's favor.'8 4
Accordingly, the Minnesota Supreme Court compelled Wakefield to dis-
close his sources.'1
8
When Wakefield refused to comply with the order, he was held in con-
tempt and fined $200 per day.8 6 Like Vanessa Leggett, Wakefield received
the support of his peers in the media.'8 7 It is understandable that journalists
would empathize with Wakefield. As a retired schoolteacher and a veteran
of the Korean War, he was a sympathetic figure facing a stiff penalty.'88 But,
like with the Vanessa Leggett case, it is unclear why journalists would be
surprised by the outcome of Wakefield's case or consider the opinion an en-
croachment on the privilege. In reaching its conclusion, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court simply followed the direction of the state's shield law which
included a special exception for defamation cases. The test was similar to
those used by federal circuits in such factual scenarios.' 89 Nothing in the
court's ruling intimated that journalists will no longer be permitted to as-
sert the privilege in Minnesota or that the court was not prepared to recog-
nize the privilege under different circumstances.190
18o Weinberger, 668 N.W.2d at 673.
181 Id. at 674 (citing § 595.025).
182 Weinberger, 668 N.W.2d at 674.
183 Id. at 674-75 (citing § 595.025).
184 Weinberger, 668 N.W.2d at 675. "It is obvious that the only persons who know the
source of each of the statements are the declarants and the reporters. It follows that if plaintiff
can[inot determine the source of the statements from the declarants, the only other available
means to secure that information is from the reporters." Id.
185 Id.
186 Part-Time Reporter Finds Himself Unlikely Journalism Hero, supra note 165.
187 "Since the coach sued, Wakefield has been subpoenaed, questioned, held up as
an example by national media groups and ordered to name his sources by the Minnesota
Supreme Court." Id.
188 Wakefield was ordered to pay $200 per day until the conclusion of Weinberger's
trial. Fortunately for Wakefield, the case settled, but he still paid $16,8oo in fines. Society
of Professional Journalists Legal Defense Fund to Receive Donation from Wakefield Defense Fund,
AscRIBE: THE PUBLIC INTEREST NEWSWIRE, March 3, 2005, available at http://www.ascribe.org/
cgi-bin/behold.pl?ascribeid=zoosoo53.10 1343&time= Io%2o27%2oPST&year=zoo5&public
=1.
189 See supra notes 15 1-67 and accompanying text.
19o See generally Weinberger, 668 N.W.2d 667.
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D. In re Special Proceedings:9' The James Taricani Case
The first of the 2004 cases grew out of a political scandal involving city
officials of Providence, Rhode Island. 192 The opprobrium resulted in two
federal corruption cases, one of which involved Frank Corrente, the admin-
istrative director for Providence's mayor, Vincent A. Cianci, Jr. 93 The trial
court recognized the explosive nature of the case and issued a pretrial pro-
tective order on August 8, 2000 that prohibited attorneys in the case from
revealing the contents of certain audio and video surveillance tapes which
were made by government officials and provided to the defense through
discovery.
194
Despite the order, James Taricani-an investigative reporter for Provi-
dence's WJAR Channel I0, an NBC affiliate-gained access to one of the
videotapes and broadcasted it on his station. 95 The tape revealed a govern-
ment witness allegedly bribing Corrente.' 96 Taricani did not reveal who he
received the tape from, noting that he promised his source confidential-
ity.197
Counsel for the defense asked the district court to probe the matter,198
which resulted in the court appointing Marc DeSisto as special prosecu-
tor to investigate. I99 DeSisto proceeded by interviewing multiple witnesses
with the goal of uncovering the tape's source.2- After concluding that he
had exhausted all other sources, he sought and received a subpoena re-
quiring Taricani to appear for questioning.21 Citing journalist's privilege,
Taricani refused to answer any of DeSisto's questions.202 "DeSisto then
filed a motion to compel, which the district court granted .... " ,3 Taricani
again refused to answer questions about the tape's source, and the district
court held him in civil contempt on March 16, 2004.204 The court imposed a
penalty of a $i,ooo fine for each day Taricani withheld the tape's source.
205
191 In re Special Proceedings, 373 E3d 37 (1 st Cir. 2004) [hereinafter the "James Taricani
Case"].
192 Id. at 40.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id. at41.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id.
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Taricani appealed the order to the U.S Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit.
2
0
6
Taricani's argument on appeal was that the district court's order violated
the First Amendment. 2 7 Specifically, he claimed that subpoenas issued by
special prosecutors should face a stricter test than subpoenas emanating
from a grand jury.20° The appellate court rejected this argument.2 °9 First,
the First Circuit noted that in Branzburg the Supreme Court had "flatly
rejected any notion of a general-purpose reporter's privilege for confiden-
tial sources.' ... The court then held that the same test should apply for
subpoenas issued from prosecutors and grand juries because "the consid-
erations bearing on privilege are the same in both cases.'"... To bolster this
finding, the First Circuit noted that the three other federal circuits which
recently decided this issue reached the same conclusion.-2
The First Circuit did concede that its prior cases required that "height-
ened sensitivity" be given to First Amendient cases. 213 But this did not af-
fect its ruling that the subpoena was constitutional. The court observed that
even if a stricter standard applied to subpoenas issuing from special pros-
ecutors, the order in question satisfied Branzburg's requirements.2 '4 There
was no doubt that DeSisto, the special prosecutor, issued the subpoena
in good faith given that he made reasonable efforts to obtain information
highly relevant to a criminal investigation from alternative witnesses. 5 As
a result, the First Circuit upheld the district court's $i,ooo per day fine."6
Taricani was ultimately assessed $85,000 in fines, and he still refused
to divulge his source.2 1 7 As a result, a federal district judge in Rhode Island
held Taricani in criminal contempt of court and sentenced him to six months
of home confinement., 8 In his ruling, Judge Torres turned the chilling ef-
fect argument cited by journalists as a rationale for a journalist's privilege
206 Id.
207 Id. at 44.
2o8 Id. at 45.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 44.
211 Id. at 45.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 46.
217 From Barbara Wartelle Wall: Legal Watch: Journalist Convicted for Refusing to Disclose
Source, GANNETT NEWS WATCH, (GANNETT NEWS WATCH is a weekly newsletter produced
by the Gannett Corporate News Department), available at http://www.gannett.com/go/
newswatch/2oo4/november/nw I 24-3.htm (last visited 9/8/05).
218 Pam Belluck, Reporter Who Shielded Source Will Serve Sentence at Home, N.Y. IMES,
Dec. 10, 2004, at A28.
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on its head: "'[a] reporter should be chilled from violating the law in order
to get a story' and 'from making ill-advised promises of confidentiality in
order to encourage a source to do so. ''2-9 Judge Torres also concluded that
Taricani deserved to be in prison, but he lightened the punishment due to
the reporter's health concerns.220
As with the Vanessa Leggett Case,2 ' it is somewhat difficult to under-
stand why Taricani's case would incite such controversy.12 As the First Cir-
cuit noted, the three federal circuits which most recently ruled on the dis-
positive issue in Taricani's case-whether subpoenas issued by a prosecutor
should be held to a heightened standard--concluded that subpoenas from
prosecutors should be judged by the same standards as subpoenas from
grand juries. In Branzburg, the Supreme Court concluded that grand jury
subpoenas ordering journalists to reveal confidential sources are constitu-
tional absent a showing of bad faith.223 It was clear that Special Prosecutor
DeSisto issued the subpoena in good faith. As a result, the First Circuit's
opinion represents a proper application of Branzburg as opposed to a new
blow against the privilege.
E. Lee v. DOJ2
4
Like Weinberger, 2 5 the journalist's privilege claims in Lee v. DOJ grew out
of civil litigation. But the similarities end there. While Weinberger involved
a high school football coach's attempts to force a semi-retired journalist to
reveal confidential sources, Lee involved a nuclear scientist's lawsuit against
the United States and his attempt to reveal the sources of journalists at some
of the nation's most important media outlets.226 The plaintiff, Dr. Wen Ho
Lee, alleged that the Department of Justice, the Department of Energy,
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation violated the federal Privacy Act of
1974 by disclosing information without his consent.227To confirm that these
agencies were the sources of the reports published and broadcasted about
2i9 Id.
220 Id.
221 See supra notes 127-5o and accompanying text.
222 It should also be noted that Taricani cuts a less sympathetic figure than Leggett. The
latter was an aspiring author attempting to solve a mystery who promised sources confidential-
ity. The former promised confidentiality to his source, too, but he essentially violated a court
order by procuring and airing the video.
223 See supra notes 72-85.
224 Lee v. DOJ, 413 F3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
225 See supra notes 168-9o and accompanying text.
226 Lee v. DOJ, 287 F Supp. 2d 15, 16-17 (D.D.C. 2003), aff'd in part and vacated in part,
413 E3d 53 (D.C. Cir. zoo5).
227 Id. at 16.
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him, Lee issued subpoenas duces tecum against the journalists responsible
for the stories concerning him.22
The journalists229 responded by moving to quash the subpoenas.2 30 They
relied on a Washington, D.C. shield law and asserted a general journalist's
privilege.231 The district court held the shield law inapplicable because
Lee's case involved federal law, not Washington, D.C., common law, and
rejected the assertion of privilege.23' Consequently,.on October 9, 2003, the
court denied the motion to quash and ordered the journalists to appear for
questioning.33
Subsequently, the journalists appeared for questioning but refused to
divulge their confidential sources. 234 Lee then moved to have the journal-
ists held in civil contempt, and on August I8, 2004, the district court en-
tered an order holding the journalists in contempt. 235 The journalists argued
for a nominal sanction of $i per day, while Lee argued for a fine of $I,000
per day, citing the fines issued in the James Taricani3 6 and Valerie Plame
cases.2 37 The court compromised and imposed a $500-per-day fine. 231 The
court stayed the fine until the journalists could have their appeal heard by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.2
39
Between 1972 (the year the Supreme Court decided Branzburg) and
2003, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia decided only
two cases involving claims of journalist's privilege.240 Both cases were civil
suits. In Carey v. Hume, the court ordered a journalist, who was the defen-
dant in a libel action, to disclose confidential sources.2 4' The court reached
this conclusion after balancing the interests of the plaintiff and the free-
dom of the press.2 42 The court said that the most important factor in balanc-
228 Id. at 17.
229 "The journalists are James Risen and Jeff Gerth of The New York Times, Robert Drogin
of The Los Angeles Times, Josef Hebert of the Associated Press; and Pierre Thomas of the Cable
News Network ("CNN")." Id. at 17 n.i.
230 Id. at 17.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 24-25.
234 Lee, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 28.
235 Id.
236 See supra notes 191-223 and accompanying text.
237 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 E3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005) [hereinafter
the "Valerie Plame Inquiry Case"]. For further analysis of the Valerie Plame Inquiry Case, see
infra notes 261-88 and accompanying text.
238 Lee, 327 F Supp. 2d at 33.
239 Id.
240 See Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Carey v. Hume, 492 Ezd 631 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
241 Carey, 492 F.2d at 632.
242 Id. at 636.
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ing these interests was whether the information sought was material to the
plaintiff's claim.43
In Zerilli v. Smith, the D.C. Circuit upheld a claim of privilege asserted
by a nonparty journalist and further refined its balancing test.-4 The court
proposed three factors that should be weighed: (i) whether the information
was material to the plaintiff's claim, (2) whether the plaintiff had exhausted
other alternative sources of the information, and (3) whether the journalist
was a party to the action.45 The court found that although the informa-
tion sought was material, the plaintiff had not exhausted other sources and
the journalist was not a party to the action.24 6 The dispositive factor was
that the plaintiff might have discovered the information sought from other
sources. 2
47
The facts of Zeilli and Lee are very similar. In both cases, the plaintiffs
sued the federal government for alleged violations of the federal Privacy
Act and sought to compel disclosure of confidential sources from nonparty
journalists.24 8 The district court, however, found that the dispositive dif-
ference between the two cases was that, in Lee, the plaintiff evidently ex-
hausted all other sources of the information.249 In upholding the contempt
orders against four of the five journalists,250 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia agreed with this conclusion, dismissing the argument
243 "The key factor which the Second Circuit identified as allowing it to move confi-
dently to [compel disclosure] was that the 'question asked of [Torre] went to the heart of the
plaintiff's claim."' Id. at 634.
244 Zetili, 656 Fad at 707.
245 Id. at 713-14.
246 Id. at 714.
247 "But appellants clearly have not fulfilled their obligation to exhaust possible
alternative sources of information." Id.
248 "Appellants... brought an action under the Privacy Act and the Fourth Amendment
against the Attorney General of the United States, the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the Department of Justice." Zeiilli, 656 Fad at 706. "By his complaint
in this case Dr. Lee sues the United States Departments of Justice and Energy... and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation... for money damages for their alleged violations of his rights
under the Privacy Act of 1974." Lee v. Dep't of Justice, 287 E Supp. 2d 15 , I6. (D.D.C. 2003),
aff'd in part and vacated in part, 413 E3d 53 (D.C. Cit. 2005).
249 "Unlike the indolent plaintiffs in Zerilli, Dr. Lee has been diligently pursuing direct
proof that officers or employees of one or more defendant agencies were the original dissemi-
nators of the information about him to the news media." Lee, 287 F Supp. ad at 2o. The court
concluded this was sufficient to satisfy the D.C. Circuit's exhaustion requirement: "The Court
reminds the journalists that the Zerilli exhaustion-of-alternative-sources factor requires only
that all 'reasonable' sources of evidence be tapped." Id. at 23.
25o The appellate court vacated the contempt order against Jeff Gerth "[blecause [he]
never refused to answer questions directly covered by the Discovery Order and consistently
professed ignorance of the identity of sources who provided information specifically about
Lee...." Lee v. Dep't of Justice, 413 F3d 53, 63 (D.C. Cit. zoo5).
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that exhaustion required "parties to take upwards of 6o-65 depositions. ' ' 251
The journalists argued that Zerilli supported such a requirement, but the
court concluded that no "specific number of depositions is necessary to cre-
ate exhaustion."22 Instead, the court stated that the number of depositions
needed to satisfy the exhaustion burden must be decided on a case-by-case
basis. 25 3 It found that Lee met this burden: "Lee has done far more to ex-
haust alternatives than the plaintiff in Zerilli who did not meet his burden,
and at least as much as the successful plaintiffs in Garland and Carey.'"25
Of the recent journalist's privilege cases discussed in this Note, Lee ap-
pears to be the most troubling to privilege proponents. This is because Lee,
like Weinberger, is a civil case, and the federal circuits are generally more
receptive to claims of privilege arising in private litigation.255 As the Van-
essa Leggett case,2s 6 McKevitt v. Pallasch,2 57 the James Taricani case,2ss and
the Valerie Plame inquiry case 59 illustrate, the federal circuits refuse to
allow assertions of privilege that arise in the criminal context. However, a
factual analysis of Lee suggests that the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia properly followed its precedent. Indeed, the court noted that it
continues to recognize a qualified privilege for nonparty journalists to civil
actions. 6 Nowhere in the opinion does the court suggest that a journalist
facing a subpoena in a Zerilli-like setting would be denied an assertion
of privilege. Consequently, Lee does not represent a new assault on the
journalist's privilege; instead, it is a proper interpretation of existing law.
F In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller:26, The Judith Miller Case.
As the D.C. Circuit notes, the Judith Miller case has its origins in President
George W. Bush's January 28, 2003, State of the Union Address.2 61 In that
speech, the president discussed the alleged efforts of Saddam Hussein to
obtain uranium from Africa. 63 Subsequently, the New York Times published
an article written by Joseph Wilson in which the author claimed that he was
251 Id. at 6o.
252 Id. at 61.
253 Id.
254 Id. For a detailed discussion of Garland, 259 E2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958), see supra notes
26-34 and accompanying text.
255 See supra notes io6-21 and accompanying text.
256 See supra notes 127-5o and accompanying text.
257 See supra notes 151-67 and accompanying text.
258 See supra notes 19 1-223 and accompanying text.
259 See infra notes 261-88 and accompanying text.
26o Leev. Dep't of Justice, 413 E3d 53, 59 (D.C. Cit. zoo5).
261 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
262 Id. at 965.
263 Id.
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sent to Africa to investigate possible Iraqi solicitation of uranium. 64 Wil-
son wrote that he found no credible evidence linking Iraq to Africa.265 The
case's next key development occurred on July 14, 2003 when the Chicago
Sun-Times published a column written by Robert Novak.2 Novak stated
that senior Bush Administration officials told him that Wilson was selected
for the mission because his wife, Valerie Plame, was a CIA field operative.
6 7
In the wake of Novak's revelation, other media outlets reported that Bush
Administration officials had contacted at least six Washington, D.C.-based
journalists and disclosed Plame's identity and occupation.
68
In response to these articles, the Department of Justice began inves-
tigating whether the government employees had violated federal law by
disclosing the identity of a CIA agent.269 The deputy attorney general ap-
pointed Patrick J. Fitzgerald, the U.S. attorney for the Northern District of
Illinois, as special counsel and gave him full authority to investigate the
disclosure. 70 The instant litigation began in earnest in May 2004 when
Fitzgerald began subpoenaing journalists to testify before a grand jury con-
vened to investigate the disclosure of Plame's identity.2 7' On September
13, 2004, Matthew Cooper, a journalist for Time Magazine, was issued his
second grand jury subpoena. 72 His employer, Time, Inc., had also been
issued a second subpoena. 273 This time, neither party cooperated with the
grand jury, and both were held in civil contempt. 74
On August I 2 and August 14 of 2004, the grand jury issued subpoenas
to Judith Miller, a journalist for the New York Times. 75 Like Cooper and
Time, Miller refused to comply with the subpoenas and moved to quash
them.76 The district court denied her motions and when she failed to com-
264 Id. at 966. The article was published on July 6, 2003. Id.
265 Id.
z66 Id.
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 Id. "[Tihe Attorney General recused himself from participation and delegated
his full authority in the investigation to the Deputy Attorney General as Acting Attorney
General." Id.
271 On May 21, 2oo4, a grand jury subpoena was issued to Matthew Cooper, a journalist
for the magazine Time, and subsequently a subpoena was issued to Time, Inc. Both Cooper
and Time moved to quash the subpoenas but had their motions denied. As a result, both were
eventually held in civil contempt of court. One of Cooper's sources subsequently released
him from his pledge of confidentiality, Cooper testified to the grand jury, and Fitzgerald, the
special counsel, moved to vacate the contempt order. Id. at 966-67.
272 Id. at 967.
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 Id.
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ply, ordered her in civil contempt of court. 77 Cooper, Time, and Miller con-
solidated their cases and appealed their contempt orders.27
8
On appeal, the journalists made four arguments, but only two concerned
the journalist's privilege.79 First, they argued that the district court's ruling
that "a reporter called to testify before a grand jury regarding confidential
information enjoys no First Amendment protection ' ' 80 is "flatly contrary
to the great weight of authority in this and other circuits.'""2 ' Citing the
Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg, the D.C. Circuit dismissed this ar-
gument."'2 Second, the court considered appellants' claim that a federal
common law privilege applied.5 3 The court disagreed about whether such
a privilege exists and whether the court should even address its existence,
but it nonetheless concluded that "if there is any such privilege, it is not
absolute and may be overcome by an appropriate showing.' '28 4 The court
found that such a showing had been made in this case.2
85
Much like the other recent decisions dealing with the journalist's privi-
lege, the Judith Miller Case is far from a novelty. As the D.C. Circuit noted,
the Supreme Court "considered and rejected" the same claims that Coo-
per, Time, and Miller argued.2 6 The D.C. Circuit simply correctly applied
the existing controlling law which has been applicable for more than thirty
years. The Supreme Court's subsequent denial of certiorari affirms this
view.25 7 In light of the application of existing law, it is difficult to understand
how the opinion could be considered a setback for privilege proponents.
277 Id.
278 Id.
279 Appellants' third argument was that their due process had been violated. Id. at 973.
The final argument was that the special counsel "did not comply with the Department of
Justice guidelines for issuing subpoenas to news media." Id. at 974. Regardless of whether the
guidelines had been violated, the court rejected this argument because it held the guidelines
do not create an enforceable right. Id. at 975.
28o Id. at 968 (quoting In re Special Counsel Investigation, 332 E Supp. 2d 26,31 (D.D.C.
2004)).
281 Id. at 968 (quoting appellants' brief to the court).
282 "Appellants are wrong. The governing authority in this case, as the District Court
correctly held, comes not from this or any other circuit, but the Supreme Court of the United
States. In Branzburg v. Hayes,... the Highest Court considered and rejected the same claim
of First Amendment privilege on facts materially indistinguishable from those at bar." Id. at
968.
283 Id. at 972-73.
284 Id. at 973.
285 Id.
286 Id. at 968.
287 Cooper v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005); Miller v. United States, 125 S. Ct.
2977 (zoo5).
In the wake of the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, Matthew Cooper, the reporter for
Time magazine, avoided jail time by making a deal with his confidential source. Adam Liptak,
Reporter Jailed After Refusing to Name Source, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, zoo5, at Ai. Judith Miller, on
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Another similarity the Judith Miller Case shares with the other recent
cases is that it is again possible to empathize with the journalists who have
been ordered in contempt. In the instant case, not one of the parties--Coo-
per, Time, or Miller-authored or published an article that disclosed Plame's
identity and occupation. Yet they were issued subpoenas while Novak,
whose column revealed Plame's CIA ties, has apparently avoided a grand
jury subpoena.2m This anomaly alone, however, is certainly not enough to
suggest that Fitzgerald, the special counsel, is conducting his investigation
in bad faith.
IV. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the quote used for this Note's Introduction has lost its prescience
after all. It no doubt encapsulated the feelings of First Amendment schol-
ars on the eve of Branzburg. But-after reviewing the recent journalist's
privilege litigation-this Note concludes that the privilege is no longer a
smoldering issue. Today, the law on privilege is relatively well settled. In
criminal cases, there is no privilege in response'to grand jury subpoenas
or subpoenas issued by special prosecutors, absent a showing of bad faith.
With respect to subpoenas from criminal defendants and subpoenas ema-
nating from civil litigation, a qualified privilege appears to exist in every
circuit.28 9 In deciding whether the assertion of privilege is proper, a court
will balance the litigant's need for the information against First Amend-
ment interests on a case-by-case basis.
The six cases discussed in this Note added no new dimensions to this
law. While they certainly did not expand the privilege, they did not narrow
it, either. Instead, they illustrate the state of contemporary privilege law.
If the above conclusion is sound, it begs the question why the recent
privilege litigation has created such controversy. Judge Torres' remarks at
James Taricani's criminal contempt sentencing offer an answer. The judge
said he wanted to use the sentencing hearing to eradicate the "myths"
surrounding privilege law. 2 - Chief among these myths was that the First
the other hand, was jailed on July 6, 2oo 5 , and was not released until September 29, 2005,
when she agreed to testify before the grand jury only after securing a waiver of confidential-
ity from her source. David Johnston and Douglas Jehl, Times Reporter Free From Jail; She Will
Testify, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005, at At.
288 "[Novak] has never said whether he has testified to the grand jury or whether he
identified his sources. [The special prosecutor] has never taken public steps to compel his
cooperation, suggesting that the prosecutor has the information he wants from Mr. Novak."
David Johnston and Richard W. Stevenson, Times Reporter Gives Testimony in CIA Leak Case,
N.Y. TMES, Oct. 1, 2005, at Ai.
289 McKevitt v. Pallasch casts some doubt on whether even a qualified privilege exists in
the Seventh Circuit. See supra Part III.B.
290 Pam Belluck, supra note 218, atA28.
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Amendment allowed a journalist to assert privilege in the face of a sub-
poena emanating from a criminal investigation.29 I In essence, Judge Torres
concluded that Taricani and proponents of a broader journalist's privilege
were ignorant of contemporary privilege law. This conclusion, with which
this Note agrees, explains the media's outrage in response to the recent
decisions9 2
Privilege proponents see every denial of privilege as a fresh assault on
a journalist's right to maintain the confidentiality of her sources. There are
two problems with this logic. First, as the discussion of the recent privilege
cases illustrates, these decisions are not new efforts at eroding the privi-
lege-they simply apply the existing law. Second, the argument is structur-
ally flawed because the Supreme Court declared in Branzburg that no abso-
lute right to privilege exists. The federal courts of appeals have interpreted
Branzburg to allow a qualified privilege in certain scenarios, but this does
nothing to lessen Branzburg's fundamental holding and its general disap-
proval of assertions of privilege.293
The recent rulings do not imply an end to all assertions of privilege,
and those who argue this point seem to misconstrue the state of privilege
law. The rulings do imply, however, that Branzburg is as binding today as
it was when decided and, consequently, that the federal judiciary will not
create a constitutional journalist's privilege. Thus, proponents of a broader
privilege should not expect to achieve this through litigation in the federal
courts. Instead, and as the Supreme Court noted in Branzburg, privilege
proponents' best option would be a congressionally enacted federal privi-
lege.294 The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in the Judith Miller case
291 Id.
292 An August 2004 New York Times article is illustrative of this point. The article reads:
Among the principles at stake in the investigation into the leak of the
name of the C.I.A. official, Valerie Plame, is that of a reporter's privilege
to avoid having to testify about confidential or unpublished information,
unless it goes "to the heart" of a particular case and cannot be otherwise
obtained. While lower-court judges have generally upheld that principle,
the reed to which they have clung-a concurrence in Justice Lewis E
Powell Jr. in a Supreme Court case from 1972 known as Branzburg-has
been characterized as relatively thin in several recent decisions.
Jacques Steinberg, Setbacks on Press Protections Are Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2004, at Ai6. The
New York Times is arguably the most respected and influential newspaper in the United States,
yet the previous passage is simply wrong. Federal judges have never "generally upheld" the
privilege when asserted in response to a grand jury or prosecutorial subpoena. Rather, the
privilege is generally denied. Perhaps it is this misconception about the state of the law con-
cerning journalist's privilege that is responsible for the criticism of these recent cases.
293 See, e.g., Scarce v. United States, 5 E3d 397, 403 (9 th Cir. 1993).
294 The owner of the New York Times, Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, Jr., has recognized that
if journalists are to gain protection from grand jury investigation, Congress will have to pro-
vide such defense; "[tlo reverse this trend, to give meaning to the guarantees of the First
Amendment and to thereby strengthen our democracy, it is now time for Congress to follow
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apparently cemented this point. That decision saw newspapers across the
country intensify calls for a federal shield law.295
Identical bills proposing such a law were introduced in both houses of
Congress in February, 2005. Titled the "Free Flow of Information Act,"
the proposed law would provide an absolute privilege for confidentiality of
sources. Both bills were referred to the respective judiciary committees of
the House and Senate and, as of August, 2005, no further action had been
taken.
96
This Note declines to discuss the merits of a federal shield law. Rather,
it merely highlights that the criticism directed at the recent privilege deci-
sions in the federal courts is legally unfounded. Those courts never recog-
nized an absolute privilege and only under certain circumstances and after
careful consideration were they willing to recognize a qualified privilege.
Criticisms suggesting otherwise irresponsibly spread the myth, to borrow
Judge Torres' word, that journalists enjoy a broad privilege. Simply put,
since 1972, journalists claims of privilege in response to subpoenas issuing
from grand juries and federal prosecutors have been roundly rejected by
the federal courts. The privilege claims of nonparty journalists to civil ac-
tions have fared better, but the privileges upheld in these scenarios have
been far from absolute. Journalists seeking a stronger privilege, therefore,
would be better served by fighting a legislative rather than a judicial battle
over the issue.
the lead of the states and enact a federal shield law for journalists." Sulzberger & Lewis, supra
note 19.
295 See, e.g., Editorial, Federal Shield Law Needed, RENO GAZETTrE-JOURNAL, July 24, 2005,
at A8; Editorial, National 'Shield' Law Needed for Journalists, THE HONOLULU ADVERTISER, July
6, 2005, at A14; Editorial, Off the Back Burner, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, July 22, 2005, at B8;
Editorial, Pass Federal Shield Law, THE TENNESSEAN, June 16, 2005, at Ai 4 ; Editorial, A Shield
For Journalists, WASH. POST, July 1, 2005, at A24.
296 Bill status can be viewed at THOMAS, at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
z?d Io9:SNoo34o:@@@Xibss/d io9query.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2005).
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